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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the impact of broad changes in the economic and
financial environment on the savings rate and portfolio composition ofindi-
viduals in different age groups and household types. Employingsurvey data,
household savings are cumulated as increases in net transactable wealth
observed across three benchmark dates: January—February 1962, the first
half of 1970, andAugust—September,1911. This paper describes how savings
rates and the allocation of accumulated savings across different financial
and real—estate assets varied with household circumstances. Asharp turn-
around is observed between the 1960s and 1910s in the profiles ofsaving
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Employing survey data on consumer balancesheets, this chapter describes mean
differences in effective savings rates and in the allocation of accumulated savings
across financial and real-estate assets for households in different demographic
circumstances. Adopting a balance-sheet perspective, effective saving is defined
as the net increase between survey dates in the amount of wealth a household holds
in the particular assets and liabilities for which survey data are collected.
Effective saving is an ex post and data-determined concept.It differs from
anticipated saving not only because of income and expenditure surprises, but also
by the amount of the unanticipated capital gain or loss that accrues on a
respondent's overall portfolio position. In that it includes the effect of revalua-
tions of existing assets, it differs also from the concept of ex saving that is
embodied in the national income and product accounts.'
Three surveys conducted by the Survey Research Center (SRC) of the
University of Michigan serve as our principal source of data. Because survey
instruments did not regularly include questions about the value of pension claims,
claims against insurance reserves, and tangible assets other than real estate, these
assets are neglected in our study. To assign a name to the wealth concept that
corresponds to the net-worth account of these truncated survey balance sheets, we
introduce the term "net transactable wealth."
In this paper, household savings are cumulated as increases in net transact-
able wealth observed across three benchmark dates: 3anuary-February 1962, the2
firsthalf of 1970, and August-September 1977. These time intervals are chosen
because in each of them the SRC conducted a comprehensive national survey of
household balance sheets. Because data were collected from over 2,000 households
in each instance, the samples are large enough to support some analysis of cross-
classified data.
Our goal is to develop and to interpret data on cross-sectional differences in
wealth trajectories through time. Our unifying hypothesis is that changes in the
economic and financiaPenironment seldom lead individuals in different demo-
graphic circumstances to effeèt parallel adjustments either in their saving rate or
in the composition of their equilibrium portfolios. This hypothesis implies that
class-level differences in the rate of wealth accumulation reflect returns from
active portfolio management as well as the passive realignment of portfolio shares
occasioned by unpredictable fluctuations in the prices of individual assets. We
strive to show that, over 1962-1977, wealth redistribution had an active as well as
a passive dimension.
Our analysis can be likened to examining the slopes of line segments drawn
triangularly through three data points. For most partitions of survey respondents,
we concern ourselves mainly with differences in the orientations of the 1962-70
and 1970-77 legs of the triangle. However, for specified age cohorts, we look also
at data covering the longer 1962-1977 segment.
APRELIMINARY LOOK AT THE DATA
Althoughthe 1962 and 1970 Surveys of Consumer Finances record holdings to the
nearest dollar (i.e., asked respondents forpointestimates), most of the balance-
sheet data collected in the 1977 Consumer Credit Survey sponsored by the Federal
Reserve Board are in interval form. To aggregate 1977observationsacross asset3
classesto estimate an individual household's transactable wealth, it is first
necessary to convert the interval estimates into point estimates.Detailed
aggregation procedures, which draw on mean values recorded for various asset-
holding intervals in the 1962 and 1970 surveys, are explained in Shumay and Kane
(1983).
Because the accuracy and representativeness ofsurvey data are always in
doubt, a responsible researcher must endeavor as far as possible to collatesurvey
measurements with comparable figures from other data sets. Reportedpercentage
allocations of consolidated transactable wealth to financial assets andreal-estate
equity differ greatly between SRC surveys of households and institutionally derived
Federal Reserve Flow of Funds (FOF) data. Averagedacross survey years, SRC
portfolio weights for financial assets are roughly 3/8. This is just over one-half of
their average weight in FOF data. For real-estate equity, the situation isreversed:
SRC weights range between 60 and 65percent,while FOF weights vary between 25
and 35percent.These discrepancies have many sources. First, in samplesurveys,
respondents have both a tendency to forget and an understandable reluctance to
disclose sensitive economic information. This leadsrespondents to misreport (and
on average to underreport) their positions in various financial assets(Ferber,
Forsythe, Guthrie, and Maynes 1969a and 1969b; Goldsmith 1982).Shumay and
Kane (1983) describe the error-detection and error-correctionprocedures to which
the 1962, the 1970, and particularly the 1977 data sets weresubjected. Answers to
straightforward questions of fact such as whether a household is a homeowneror
has mortgage debt should be more reliable than value estimates. Inan interview
situation, a household that owns a wide variety of stocks and bondsmay easily
overlook its position in particular securities. Second, valuation skillsmay differ
across respondents, especially for real-estate assets. Third, valuationprinciples,4
intrayear timing, and reporting categories differ between the SRC and Flow of
Funds accounts. In the Flow of Funds accounts, the household sector includes
personal trusts and nonprofit organizations, and a category of miscellaneous assets
exists. A fourth complication is that the interviewing unit in SRC surveys shifted
after 1964 from the "spending unit" to the "family unit."
In view of these discrepancies, the purpose of this paper is not to produce
unbiased estimates of consolidated balance sheets for the household sector as a
whole. Rather, it is to examine differences in saving and portfolio behavior across
households nartitioned by ae and family comoosition. To assess the reoresenta- — --
tivenessof SRC samples and of our aggregation procedures vis-a-vis patterns of
incremental wealth accumulation, Table 9-1 compares cumulative movements
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shownfor the pooled cross-section sample between survey dates with time-series
changes reported in FOF data covering approximately the same intervals. SRC and
FOF estimates of cumulative growth rates for deposits and savings bonds and for
owner-occupied real estate are similar in both periods, but especially for 1962-1970
other categories diverge considerably. In part this is because, in an effort to
compensate for the greater nonreporting of financial information by high-income
households, SRC surveys oversample high-income households (Katona, Mandell, and
Schmiedescamp, 197 1:3-4; Durkin and Elliehausen, 1978: 97-99). Measured against
Census data, the concentration on hii nrome households increased from the 1970
to 1977 survey. In Table 9-1, the divergences are greatest for assets favored by
wealthy households:for corporate equities, for marketable bonds (where, by
recording increases in par values without respect to ongoing price depreciation,
SRC surveys seriously overstate value growth in an era of rising interest rates), and5
for thecategoryof investment real estate (which has no strict counterpart in the
Flow of Funds accounts). In addition, these same assets bulk large in the portfolios
of personal trusts and nonprofit organizations. Goldsmith reports that nonprofit
organizations greatly reduced the weight of bonds and stocks in their portfolios
between 1964 and 1975. Except for corporate equities, the alternative estimates
of cumulative growth in net transactable wealth prove doser f or the 1970-77
period (which makes use of the same concept of interviewing unit at both end
dates) than for 1962-70.
For equity in homes, it proved impossible to maintain complete comparability
between 1977 and earlier survey data. First, fully 6.6 percent of 1977 respondent
households reported themselves as homeowners without revealing either the value
of their home or information about the terms of theirmortgage. Second, unlike
the 1962 and 1970 survey instruments, the 1977 questionnaire did not ask for the
value of outstanding mortgage debt. Fortunately, in all but 57 cases (2.2percent
of sample respondents and 5.2 percent of the 1,099 mortgagors in the sample), it
proved possible to estimate the book value of mortgage debt from information
concerning the terms of the mortgage. In the sample analyzed in this study, the
homeownership rate falls short of the 64.8 percent Census estimate for 1977
reported by Carliner (1982), even though the unedited survey sample showed a
homeownership rate of 68.9 percent. Moreover, the deletion bias does not fall
uniformly across various demographic partitions. In particular, because families
that have undergone some form of breakup or have occupied a home for along time
are more likely to fail to report the value of their home as well as to forget
relevant information or to report inconsistent mortgage terms, the cases deleted
include a disproportionately large number of older mortgagors. The edited sample's
lack of representativeness can be assessed from Table 9-2, whichcompares6
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homeownership rates in our 1977 sample with two-age dass partitions published in
Carliner (1982). Data presented in Table 9-9 show that the percentage of deleted
homeowners increases steadily with the age of a household's head.
FACTORSDIFFERENTIALLY AFFECTING HOUSEHOLD SAVINGS
PATTERNS IN THE 1960s AND 1970s
Modern theoriesof consumption emphasize that, for a representative household,
savings behavior differs as it moves through the life cycle. Life-cycle theories of
saving (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954; Ando and Modigliani 1963) hold that, over
its lifetime, a household accumulates and decumulates wealth to smooth the
timestream of its consumption expenditures by offsetting the effects of anticipat-
ed and unanticipated variation in income receipts and in spending goals. Spending
goals indude predictable and partly controllable bulges in expenditure, such as
those occasioned by retirement, college expenses, vacations, and downpayments on
big-ticket items such as cars and houses. They also indude provisions for bequests
and unpredictable (and often uncontrollable) bulges in expenditure such as for
household repairs and health emergencies. If it could ignore complications due to
uncertainty about the age of death, this theory would predict that, as a household
approached the end of its expected life span, it would plan to decumulate wealth to
the level of intended bequests.
Because differences in implicit and explicit transactions charges and in
securities' minimum denominations affect the liquidity of various assets, the
existence of a life cycle in saving patterns suggests the likelihood of a correspond-
ing life cycle in patterns of asset holding. In this second life cycle, we may expect
differences in age-class transactions costs, tax structure, and portfolio risks to
play an important role. 1-listorically, securities dealers and brokers have priced7
their services in waysthat discouragesmall individual trades: imposing odd-lot
fees, transactions minima, and per-trade charges. Calculated as a percentage of
the value of a trade, explicit transactions charges fall as the dollar amount
increases.Although we may presume that this schedule of charges mirrors
underlying broker costs, it predisposes financial investments by low-wealth house-
holds toward small-denomination retail assets such as deposits and U.S.savings
bonds. At the same time, households must worry about theexposure of their
accumulated wealth to implicit and explicit taxation and to various kinds of risk.
Differential changes between survey dates in age-class transactionscosts, tax
structure, and portfolio risk-return loci should lead to a change in the equilibrium
composition of age-class portfolios.For convenience, we may call this the
portfolio-churning hypotheses.
Of course, the distribution of wealth across age dassesmay change without
active churning of household balance sheets. Passive churning occurs when the
prices of assets held to a disproportionate extent by particular age classes appreci-
ate or depreciate faster than the prices of other assets. Overany interest-rate
cycle, passive churning occurs because the assets favored by low-wealth households
(checking accounts and passbook savings accounts) are fixed in value, while the
value of highly wealth-elastic assets such as stocks, bonds, and real estate
fluctuate with market forces. As Table 9-3 shows, between the 1962 and 1970
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survey dates, savings accounts and U.S. Treasury bills both returned about 12.5
percent after inflation while common stock and single-family homes both appreci-
ated 28 percent. However, in the 1970-1977 period, while liquid investments in
Treasury bills held their real value only slightly better than savings accounts did,
stocks and bonds appreciated at greatly divergent rates. As stock pricesrose less8
than 8 percent, the value of single-family homes increased 85.4 percent. Even
ignoring the implicit or shelter services a house provides, over 1970-77 housing
investments far outperformed financial assets.
Real-estate and stock prices move in response to private economic forces
such as exogenous movements in construction costs, to demographic pressures, and
to government taxes and subsidies. In particular, much of the active and passive
churning observed in the 1960s and 1970s was driven by the interaction of
unanticipatedly accelerating inflation with the inherited structure of deposit-rate
ceilings, deposit insurance, federal income taxes, and housing subsidies. House-
holds also responded to changes in taxes and regulations that, after a lag,
authorities made to adapt taxes and regulatory policies to ongoing inflation.
For households, the federal income tax is nonneutral with respect to inflation
in two principal ways. First, capital-gains taxes (though set typically at only a
fraction of tax rates on ordinary income) are levied even when purely nominal price
increases are realized in the sale of physical assets. Second, federal taxes are
levied progressively on nominal incomes. For both reasons, inflation tends over
time to push given levels of real personal income into potentially higher and higher
tax brackets. Bracket drift simultaneously puts pressure on Congress to lower
statutory tax rates and raises the incentive for households to engage in tax-
avoidance activity. Estimates of average marginal tax rates on personal income
show a small upward drift between survey dates (Barro and Sahasakul 1983).
Moreover, the changing structure of tax rates, particularly on explicit capital
income as documented by Estrella and Fuhrer (1983), ought to have affected
various types of households differently.
During 1970-77, effective tax rates on capital gains were increased in several
ways. First, over 1970-1972, the maximum tax rate on long-term capital gains was9
increased in three steps to 35percent.However, until 1978, the tax rate on the
first $50,000 of an individual's capital gains was capped at 25 percent. Second, the
holding period necessary to qualify a capital asset for preferential long-term
capital-gains treatment was raised from six months to nine months in 1977 and to
one year in 1978. Third, beginning in 1970, net long-term capital losses of $1000 or
less could no longer be deducted in full against ordinary income. Henceforth, only
50 percent of these losses could be deducted, again up to a maximum deduction of
$1000 (now $3000) in any tax year.
It is widely believed that, because service returns and capital gains from
investments in owner-occupied housing continued to be treated preferentially
throughout the 1970s, unanticipated increases in inflation and inflation risk tended
to raise the price of owner-occupied homes relative to stock prices (DeLeeuw and
Ozanne 1979; Summers 1981; Hendershott and Hu 1983).2Tax preferences
accorded owner-occupied housing include nontaxation of the value of the services
provided by an owner-occupied home, the capacity for repeated deferrals of capital
gains due on changes in residence, and a once-in-a-lifetime forgiveness of some of
the capital-gains taxes that would otherwise be due on the sale of a principal
residence once the seller has attained a designated age. Before July 26, 1978,
gains on the sale of a principal residence with an adjusted sales price of $35,000 or
less were not taxable for sellers who were 65orolder and who had occupied the
residence for five of the eight years preceding the sale. In cases where the
adjusted sales price exceeded $35,000, sellers who met the age and occupancy tests
could still exclude a portion of the gain from taxation. In 1978, the criticalage
was lowered to 55,theoccupancy rule shortened to three of five years, and the
excludable amount raised to $100,000. (While not strictly indexed with inflation,10
the maximum exclusion has since been raised to $125,000.) Although the alteration
in the capital-gains tax forgiveness on sales of homes occurred after the 1977
survey date, it would not have found a place on the legislative agenda unless
households who were in or approaching the 55-64 age range were fighting for it
politically during the preceding years. The cost of mobilizing political resources to
extract a new tax advantage suggests that, during the 1970s, many so-called
"empty nest" households must have been contemplating the sale of what had
become in terms of its size or implied burden of school taxes an inappropriate
house.
It should be clear that the value of the in-kind services a house performs for
its occupants varies with the composition of the household residing in it. Because
these services are not taxed for owner-occupants, changes in the structure of
explicit taxes differentially affect implicit rates of return on rental and owner-
occupied types of housing.
Leveraged investments in housing financed with regulatorily subsidized fixed-
rate mortgages benefited additionally from unanticipated inflation. Unanticipated
inflation lowers the real burden of fixed-rate mortgage debt (see Hendershott and
Hu 1981). With returns on financial instruments distorted by deposit-rate ceilings
and multiple regulatory subsidization of homeownership and home financing (see
Kane 1981), no other easily available financial transaction offered established or
growing households of low or average wealth as high an anticipated real after-tax
rate of return or as favorable a hedge against unanticipated inflation.
Extended to savings-and-loan associations in 1966, ceilings on nominal
interest rates payable on deposits discriminated against low-wealth households.
Regulators selectively relaxed these ceilings in the 1970s by tying differences in
ceiling rates on certificate accounts to differences in maturity and minimum
denominations. This helped deposit institutions to discriminate more effectively
between interest-sensitive and interest-insensitive low-wealth customers. As11
Table 9-3 shows, this discrimination pushed inflation-adjusted explicit returns in
the 1970s on savings accounts below those on Treasury bills and left them sharply
negative for passbook savings.
Opportunities to counterbalance the negative real after-tax rates of explicit
returns on deposit assets differed with the level of household wealth. For wealthy
households, they differed also between the 1960s and 1970s. In either era, wealthy
households could better extract a compensating stream of implicit returns from
deposit institutions and move wealth more efficiently into stocks and bonds.
Transactions costs and the risks of being underdiversified made these avenues less
feasible for low-wealth households. Similarly, when money-market mutual funds
(whose rate of growth first surged in 1974) and the variety of high-rate certificate-
of-deposit (CD) accounts expanded in the 1970s, financial-market opportunities
improved f or households of moderate and high wealth. But these changes did little
for low-wealth investors. Hence, while wealthy households could reallocate their
portfolios to escape most of the ex ante burden that anticipated inflation and
deposit-rate regulation would otherwise place on them, throughout the period of
observation, poor households were more tightly constrained. Two principal avenues
of adjustment were open to low-wealth households: (1) to make highlyleveraged
investments in housing and durable goods, and (2) to cut back their overall rate of
saving.
This study focuses on transactable and noncontractual savings, forms of
household wealth that are not administered by outside parties such as insurance
companies, pension funds, and the Social Security System. However, we must
recognize that wealth accumulated in contractual arrangements should, as explain-
ed in Munnell (1981), condition a household's decisions about how to accumulate and
to manage transactable wealth. Whatever life cycle in portfolio structure we
observe must be interpreted in the light of the lifetime pattern of simultaneous and12
partlyexogenousgrowth in the risk-adjusted present value of households' pension-
fund and social-security claims.3 In 1972, the decision to increase real social-
security benefits and to double-index them to an upwardly biased consumer price
index may be interpreted as a governmental redistribution of wealth from younger
to older households.This redistribution, which also reduced older households'
exposure to inflation risk, might have altered each group's need for transactable
saving.
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SAVINGS BEHAVIOR
We hypothesizethat a household's effective saving rate over any period
varies with its place in the life cycle, its size, and the marital status of its head.
We further hypothesize that, as the economic and financial environment changes,
class-level saving rates and portfolio structures vary actively as well as passively.
Passively, any dass of households tends to gain or lose wealth relative to other
classes whenever assets in which that class historically maintains a disproportion-
ately large position experience an unanticipated increase or decrease in value.
This hypothesis implies that on average windfall gains and losses on particular
assets impact saving as well as consumption. Asset revaluation is only partly
offset by readjustments in the level and composition of new savings (Jianakop1os
1983).Actively, households in any dass adapt their portfolios to differential
movements in the net after-tax risk-adjusted real returns anticipated on different
assets. Because anticipated returns were not observed for survey respondents, the
institutional facts developed in the previous section are used along with the ex
returns listed in Table 9-3 as proxies for the set of information on which a rational
respondent would have conditioned his or her rate-of-return forecasts. Particular13
stress is placed on the roles played by three factors: differential changes in
implicit returns on owner-occupied housing, the 1965 expansion of deposit-rate
regulation and its subsequent decline in effectiveness, and the level of a house-
hold's wealth as a restraint on incentives to engage in disintermediation.
To examine what we may call the life-cycle, family-size, and marital-status
hypotheses, we develop a series of statistical tables. The first two tables present
evidence on differences in propensities to save and in patterns of real wealth
accumulation. These tables are reported for every partition we examine. Other
tables track differences in class-level positions in particular assets. These tables
throw light on the extent to which active and passive portfolio churning may be
observed at the dass-level.
Although portfolio churning is examined in detail only for age classes, we
compare summary distributions for all sample partitions of class-level positions in
selected financial and real-estate assets with the percent of sample families in
each class. These tables amount to a series of Lorenz curves for assets.
For age classes and age cohorts, various additional tables are developed. Two
of these disaggregate percentage and dollar changes in class-level wealth across
specific financial and real-estate opportunities. These tables support inferences
about the allocation of new saving. A third table reports mean wealth and
homeownership and mortgagor rates for each class. Finally, for age classes only,
wealth-based Engels curves are estimated for four types of financial and real-
estate investments.Differences in Engels-curve coefficients are tested both
across survey dates and across age classes at each date. This analysis provides
additional evidence on the extent of active and passive portfolio churhing.
OBSERVED SI-LIFTS INLIFE-CYCLE SAVINGS PATTERNS
Tables9-4 through 9-9 compare househo'ds at identical stages of the life cycle
across time. Table 9-4 focuses on mean savings in dollars and on ratios of real14
(i.e., inflation-adjusted) saving to real income. The ratios reported in the table
tend to overstate the magnitude of age-class average propensities to save because
incomes reported by survey respondents tend to be understated. Survey responses
are subject to deliberate underreporting and omit imputed income such as
unrealized capital gains, the services of owner-occupied housing, and implicit
interest received as subsidized accountholder services from deposit institutions.
This error in measurement tends to raise reported saving-to-income ratios for
all groups.If we ignore possible differences in measurement errors across
demographic classes, Table 9-4 indicates that, during the 1960s, households whose
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heads were at least 55 years old saved a much larger percentage of their real
incomes than younger persons did.Moreover, unless it reflects age-related
reporting bias in 1977 home equity or unanticipated passive appreciation of existing
portfolio holdings, the high rate of accumulation observed in the 1960s f or
households in the 65-and-over category is hard to reconcile with the life-cycle
theory.But increased life-cycle decumulation by older households and the
hypothesized redistributive impact of social-security indexing is consistent with
the turnaround between the 1960s and the 1970s in effective patterns of life-cycle
saving reported in the table. This pattern pivots like a mirror image around the
breakpoint observed at age 55.Below this age, households increased their
effective saving rates substantially during the 1970s. However, over the same
period, older households greatly reduced their effective saving rates. Comparing
1972-73 with 1962 behavior in an income-expenditure data set, Lieberman and
Wachtel (1980) report a similarly sharp dedine in the savings rate of older
households that predates the 1974 adjustment in social-security benefits.
Table 9-5 reports cumulative growth rates for mean nominal wealth and mean
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real wealth. As explained in the note to the table, the cumulative rate of increase
in real wealth is calculated from the ratio of mean end-date wealth to inflation-
adjusted base-date wealth. The table provides further evidence that age-group
wealth trajectories differed sharply between the two periods. During the l960s,
wealth accumulation by households whose heads were 55andolder greatly outpaced
the savings growth achieved by younger households. In the 1970-77 period, the
reverse proves true. Although two-thirds of the population of sample households
were on balance net savers during the 1970s, these households were the youngest
ones. Because the proportion of transactable wealth controlled by households in
the designated age dasses rises on average with the age of the household head, the
pooled growth rate in real saving fell by almost two-thirds.
Table 9-6 shows mean dollar increments experienced in three broad compo-
nents of net transactable wealth: retail financial assets (deposits and savings
bonds), wholesale financial assets (stocks and bonds), and equity in real estate (i.e.,
value of real-estate assets less mortgage debt). To allow readers to unravel the
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effect of mortgage leverage, an additional column describes the cumulative
increase in the market value of real-estate assets. The table indicates that, for
households above and below age 55,differentialrates of wealth accumulation
spread across portfolio categories during the 1970s, but (in keeping with the wealth
constraint on opportunities for disintermediation) differences observed during the
1960s were dominated by differences in the flow of new savings into wholesale
financial assets.
Table 9-7 illustrates the proportionate weight carried by real-estate invest-
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ment as a vehicle of household wealth accumulation. Real-estate equity is defined
as the difference between the market value of real-estate owned and the book16
value of mortgage debt secured by these holdings.4 This variable is dominated by
equity in homes. For survey respondents in the 1960s and 1970s, real-estate equity
carried roughly 60 percent of the overall increase in mean household wealth.
For each survey date, Table 9-8 shows the distribution across age classes of
retail financial assets (deposits and savings bonds), wholesale financial assets
(stocks and marketable bonds), real-estate equity, net transactable wealth, and the
value of owner-occupied housing. This table presents something like a Lorenz
curve
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for age classes. It lets us see that the age structure of the population interacts
with life-cyde patterns of asset accumulation to determine the share of national
wealth controlled by a given age group.To assess the degree of wealth
redistribution occurring across age classes between survey dates, it is useful to
focus on changes in what we may call the control ratio: the percentage of net
transactable wealth held per each one percent of respondents in a given age class.
For this purpose, it is convenient to consolidate households into three age dasses:
under 35, 35 to 54, and 55 and older. In 1962, older households held the greatest
percentage control of transactable wealth. Their control ratio stood at 1.44, as
against 1.14 for rniddle-.aged households and 0.34 for young ones. Between 1962
and 1970, and in keeping with the savings rates shown in Tables 9-4 and 9-5, older
households improved their control ratio even further, to 1.73 as against declines to
0.95 and 0.23 for middle-aged and young households, respectively. However, the
high saving rates maintained by young and middle-aged households during the 1970s
improved their 1977 ratios. In 1977, the control ratios were 0.42, 1.28, and 1.26,
respectively.If these changes were due only to passive portfolio churning,
percentage control of component assets would not change at all. Contrary to the17
temporal variation shown in the data underlying Table 9-8, control ratios for
individual asset categories (e.g., for the value of homes) would have to remain
constant over time.
Table 9-9 shows that at each survey date mean wealth, homeownership rates,
and use of mortgage leveraging differed across age groups. For the first of these
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variables, the table also reports the standard error of the mean. Even allowing for
age-level differences in leverage, variation in the percentage of wealth allocated
to leveraged investments in housing across age-group portfolios made passive
opportunities to benefit from unanticipated inflation in 1962 lowest for very young
households and highest for middle-aged ones. This table provides evidence that
unanticipated returns on accumulated wealth cannot account fully for the turn-
around in the age profile of effective savings performance during the 1970s. New
saving by young households is suggested by their establishing a steadily higher
percentage of homeownership. Even allowing for the bias in our estimates of age-
class homeownership rates, the table suggests that during the 1970s, some empty-
nest housing was bid away from households in the 55-and.-over group.5 Given young
families' typically high use of leverage in their housing investments, their expanded
homeownership rates repositioned them to realize portfolio gains from anticipated
and unanticipated inflation.
TESTING FOR SHIFTS IN WEALTH-HOLDING PATTERNS
These data show that wealth-holding patterns differ both across age groups and
across time. This section fits these patterns into a framework of optimal choice.
Modern portfolio theory portrays balance-sheet choices as allocating wealth
in response to variation in the mean vector and covariance matrix of asset returns18
(Friedman 1982).In this application, these choices should be conditioned by
unobserved differences in the composition of an individual's holdings of nonmarket-
able assets such as pension claims and human capital (Mayers 1973). Taxes and
transactions costs may (at least as an interpretive first approximation) both be
presumed to vary with portfolio size. However, the means and covariances of asset
returns (although not necessarily the marginal risks) should be the same for all
households at each date. Hçnce, a particularly straightforward way to explain
differences in asset-holding patterns is to estimate for every age group at each
survey date a set of wealth-based Engels curves for the main components of
transactable wealth. We interpret each curve as showing how the increment in
wealth that a household desires to place in a particular portfolio component varies
with the level of household wealth.
Using a quadratic approximation, Tables 9-10, 9-11, 9-12, and 9-13 report
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estimates of wealth-based Engels curves for retail financial assets, wholesale
financial assets, home equity, and equity in investment real estate.Because
reported portfolio positions in these assets never fall below zero, a Tobit limited-
dependent-variable estimation procedure is employed.Respecting individual
balance-sheet constraints, when the censored-regression equations for any age
dass are summed across the four portfolio opportunities, the wealth coefficients
must sum to one, while the intercepts and wealth-squared terms must each sum to
zero. Except for the 65-and-over group in 1977, mean wealth rises with age. The
column labeled "wealth-squared coefficient times twice mean wealth" tells us how
much the first derivative of the mean portfolio position with respect to wealth
departs from the regression coefficient for wealth. The sum of this adjusted
coefficient and the regression coefficient for wealth represents the marginal19
proportion of mean wealth that allocated to the asset class in question. Although
deviations between the marginal proportion and the wealth coefficientrange up to
0.125 in magnitude, the median adjustment is less than 0.05.
The tables show that, across age groups and dates, portfolio positions in all
four portfolio categories generally increase with household wealth. The major
differences concern life-cycle differences in allocation patterns and the sensitivity
of incremental allocation rates to the level of wealth. For mostage groups, what
we may call the marginal propensity to hold retail financial assets and real-estate
equity decreases with wealth. On the other hand, the marginal propensity to hold
wholesale financial assets increases with wealth.
Estimated differences in the wealth sensitivity of the various marginal
propensities accord broadly with conventional wisdom about the role of trans-
actions costs, minimum denominations, and difficulties in arranging credit as
barriers to investment by low-wealth households in wholesale financial assets and
investment real estate (Kane 1980). As compared to low-wealth households, high-
wealth households should hold retail financial assets more for liquidity and
diversification purposes than as vehicles for maximal accumulation of expected
future wealth.
For retail financial assets, wholesale financial assets, and (to reduce the
number of computer runs) the sum of the two kinds of equity in real-estate, formal
tests were conducted of differences in coefficient estimates across age classes and
across survey dates. These tests apply one-zero dummy variables for specific dates
and age classes to all three parameters in the model. Because observations on the
regressand are truncated in Tobit estimation, the distribution of the "t-statistics"
developed may not be well-approximated by Student's t when the number of
nonlimit observations is small.20
Differences in Engels coefficients across time may be attributed to differ-
ences in the mean vector and covariance matrix of anticipated risk-adjusted after-
tax returns on the component assets at different dates, to differences in the range
of wealth observed, and to sampling error as well. Differences in coefficients
across age groups reflect differences in life—cycle status, effective transactions
costs, and range of wealth observed, as well as sampling error once again.
Coefficient Differences Across Age Groups
On a cross-section basis, we are interested at each survey date in the significance
of differences in coefficieht estimates across age classes, If significant differ-
ences did not exist, studying age-dass Engels curves for assets would have no
statistical justification.
Although to save space the detailed results are not reported here, we used
slope and intercept dummy variables to test the significance of differences
between coefficient estimates for every age-class pair. For all equations, in both
1962 and 1977, significant differences prove to be the rule rather than the
exception. On average in these years, two-thirds of the slope coefficients and 40
percent of the intercepts differ significantly from the corresponding estimates for
other classes.In 1970, only about one—fifth of the coefficient pairs differ
significantly, with significant differences particularly rare in the equation for real—
estate equity. We interpret the similarity of coefficient pairs in 1970 as evidence
that wealth-related constraints on a household's ability to engage in disintermedia-
tion temporarily became a more important force in portfolio allocation than hf e-
cycle considerations.21
Coefficient Differences Over Time
Tables 9-10, 9-11, and9-14indicate that, for retail financial assets, wholesale
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financial assets and real-estate equity, more than half of the estimatedslope
coefficients differ significantly across survey dates.The significance of coeff i-
cient differences is somewhat more frequent for the(quaçlratic than for the linear
term. This is important because an individual's marginal allocation toa given asset
deviates from the wealth coefficient by the product of the coefficient forthe
quadratic term and twice the individual's level of wealth.
The pattern of differences observed is consistent with thehypothesis that the
benefits of financial disintermediation increase with household wealth.Although
importantly constrained by the evolving structure of taxes and transactionscosts,
households actively reallocated their portfolios toprotect themselves against the
interaction of ceilings on explicit nominal rates of interest ondeposit assets with
rising market rates of interest.
Between 1962 and 1970, older households increased theirpropensity to hold
wholesale assets and decreased their propensity to hold retailassets and home
equity.Although households in the under-45 group increased their marginal
propensity to hold retail assets, this propensity to hold financial assets of either
kind became more sensitive to increases with wealth.Older and wealthier
households showed a reduced disposition to hold retail financial assets anda higher
propensity to invest in more-volatile wholesale securities. The resulting increase
in the demand for brokerage services droveup transactions costs in wholesale
markets, especially for small trades (Kane 1980).These transactions-cost
increases reinforced the attractiveness tovery-young families of leveraged invest-
ments in homes, bringing about a reverse shift in wealth propensities foryounger
households.22
Schemes for paying implicit interest on household deposits (e.g., "free"
checking) proliferated in the 1970s and the regulatory strategy shifted to one of
letting the ceiling rate on a deposit account more closely approach its market level
the larger the account's minimum denomination and the longer its stated maturity.
In addition, as shown in Table 9-3, 1970-77 holding-period returns on stocks and
Treasury bills proved negative in real terms. For at least some of these reasons, as
our data show, between 1970 and 1977 retail assets regained their former
attractiveness to older households, while wholesale assets lost some of their luster.
Young and middle-aged families generally increased their propensity to allocate
wealth to real estate, while this propensity declined significantly for (nonmarried)
households in the 65-and-over group.
ACCUMULATIONS BY AGE COHORTS
Another way to look at patterns of life-cyde saving is to study how the mean net
worth of a particular age cohort behaves as members of the cohort grow older.
Here, the focus falls on transitions through a prolonged preretirement phase of
average wealth accumulation into a hypothesized phase of planned wealth decumu-
lation.
Table 9-15 pushes forward the age cohorts reported in Table 9-4 and 9-5 for
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the 1962 and 1970 surveys to develop comparable data for appropriately older
respondents in the 1970 and 1977 surveys. The table deletes the wealth of
household heads that were under 18 in 1962 and 1970 and therefore too young to be
sampled. Following age classes through time provides something akin to a panel
perspective on patterns of life-cycle saving. We see that, in all cohorts, households
managed to increase their mean real net worth from 1962 to 1970. However, the23
second panel shows that, during the 1970s, the per-year rate of real accumulation
increased dramatically for the youngest 1962 cohort, decreased for the fourth
cohort (some of whom were passing into the retirement stage), and turned negative
for the two oldest cohorts.The third panel, which compares post-sample
accumulation rates for 1962 and 1970 cohorts, shows a similar picture.
Economic theory treats changes in saving rates as adaptive responses to
changing requirements for consumption smoothing. In the 1970s, the two oldest
cohorts experienced consumption-expanding windfall gains in wealth from two
sources; the double-indexing of social-security benefits and unanticipated appreci-
ation in real housing prices. For these cohorts, the desirability of decumulating
transactable wealth may have been further enhanced by the structure of capital-
gains taxes and dedines in reported mean real incomes of 20 and 30 percent,
respectively. If the two youngest cohorts' sharply higher savings rates represents
consumption smoothing too, it may be due mainly to unanticipated increases in the
capitalized real value of fulfilling their lifetime housing needs. We show in the
next section that families with three or more children (for whom the average
implicit return on housing space is greatest) greatly increased their mean saving
rate in the 1970s, while smaller families drastically reduced theirs. Given the
secularly rising divorce rate, in the 1970s some small-sized families may have been
adapting to a reduction in family size.
To carry out plans to increase their mean rate of homeownership in the
1970s, many young households may have postponed the consumption of other goods
and services. Although SRC data do not bear on this issue, young households may
also have perceived secular growth in the size of government transfer programs as
increasing the discounted real value of their lifetime tax bills.
Tables 9-16 and 9-17 provide evidence on the composition of age-cohort
savings across different survey dates. Mean dollar increments in the values of24
real-estate assets and of three components of net transactable wealth are shown in
Table 9-16. Data on real-estate assets are included to permit the interested reader
to decompose increases in real-estate equity into price-appreciation, portfolio-
rebalancing, and debt-expansion elements. Although component-by-component
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growth rates vary widely across age classes and asset categories (from -61.2
percent to 5181.5 percent), Table 9-17 darifies that for every age class whose
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mean nominal wealth increased (i.e., all but the 72-and-older group in 1970-77),
real-estate equity served in both periods as the major vehide for carrying
increased wealth across time.
Lorenz distributions for age cohorts are displayed in Table 9-18. For each
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asset category, percentage control ratios are reported in parentheses. These
control percentages show the relative position that a representative household
takes in each type of wealth as it ages. For most assets and dates, the control
percentage follows a humped or inverted-U curve. The typical curve reaches its
maximum in middle age. Compared to financial assets, real-estate equity shows
higher values for young cohorts and generally peaks at an earlier age. The control
percentage for wholesale financial assets rises relative to retail assets as house-
holds move through their 30s and 40s. Households in their 50s and early 60s hold
the maximal percentage of wholesale assets, but this percentage falls off rapidly
when they reach retirement age.Although for comparable age dasses the
percentage level of control varies across survey dates (presumably with differences
in the economic environment), the qualitative association with the life cycle does
not.
Table 9-19 focuses on changes in the homeownership rate and use of25
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mortgage debt across time. Allowing for the extent to which the understatement
of 1977 homeownership rates rises with age, the table provides time-series
confirmation of cross-section evidence on life-cycle patterns of homeownership
andmortgage repayment. Both within and across survey dates, homeownership
ratesare seen to rise into late middle age and to fall off thereafter, while the use
of mortgage debt dedines steadily as a household ages.
DIFFERENCESIN ACCUMULATION RATES FOR
HOUSEHOLDS OF DIFFERENT SIZES
Formany households, family size rises and falls over the life cyde in a humped
pattern that parallels the rise and fall of age-class homeownership rates. This
cyde in the size of the typical nuclear family reflects corresponding cycles in the
market value of its human capital, in marginal in-kind rates of return on given
amounts of housing space and school taxes, and in the household's detailed
expenditure goals.
One-person households consist of bachelors, divorced and separated indi-
viduals, and widowed persons. The age distribution of this group may have distinct
modes for each component dass. The above-averageage and high standard
deviation shown for one-person households in Table 9-20 supports thispresumption
of rnultimodality.
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Two-person households consist of childless couples, older "empty-nest" cou-
ples, widowed, divorced, and even single parties with one child, and various
combinations of unmarried adults. The high (though falling)average age reported
for heads of two-person households in Table 9-20 is consistent with the hypothesis
that the mean number of children in these households is small.26
Tables 9-21 and 9-22' show a sharp change in effective savings propensities
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between the 1960s and the 1970s paralleling the age-class reversals reported
earlier. Households of three or more persons were much more effective savers in
the 1970-77 period than in the 1962-70 era.Correspondingly, while smaller
households grew wealthier during the 1960s, on average they drew down their real
wealth during the 1970s.
These patterns may be explained as adaptations to changes observed between
survey dates in tax structure, financial transactions costs, and risk-return oppor-
ti,nitip Aridiiite4 rl ftr_tv rtiirrvfinnr.i.I fc+Il tk • ••% Sf1 L*l fl•.4U 15._fl 5a •a1J5.J%.b?S5_,Lfl, 1.1
relatively constant real in-kind return on housing space for large households made
it optimal for them to expand their housing investments more than a smaller
household would. Interacting with the life cycle, the proportion of households
owning their home rises sharply with household size, as does the use of mortgage
leverage. For households with three or more persons, ownership and mortgagor
rates are twice as high as for smaller households. Table 9-23 shows that positions
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in real-estate equity and owner-occupied housing also increase with household size.
Although two-person households have higher per-capita wealth than the other
categories at all three survey dates, during the 1970s larger households narrowed
the gap considerably. In contrast, the relative positions of one-person households
change little across dates. Differential savings performance across size classes in
the two eras does not merely reflect the passive interaction of increasing real-
estate prices with the positive association between prior real-estate holdings and
household size.During the 1970s, large families increased their holdings of27
financial assets even more rapidly than their real-estate equity. This increased
financial saving may have two sources.First, it may reflect the efforts of
households still occupying rental housing to accumulate a sufficient downpayment
to support a planned house purchase. Second, it may reflect the use ofmortgage
credit (which to most households represents the low-cost form of credit available)
to support financial investments.
DIFFERENCES IN ACCUMULATION RATES FOR
DIFFERENT TYPES OF HOUSEHOLDS
Table 9-24 explores the relationship between household size and marital status.
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During the 1960s, all types of large households were less-effective savers than
smaller ones. Moreover, the 1970-77 increase in savings propensities for large
households was limited to married and other nonsingle .(i.e., widowed, separated,
and divorced) households.This provides further support for the view that
movements in the expected value and variance of implicit returns on owner-
occupied housing explain a good part of the divergent movements in saving
propensities during the 1970s. These families' future housing requirements may be
presumed to be more stable than those for single households. During the 1970s,
large single households dissaved at a high rate.
Table 9-25 shows the effect of changing savings propensities on the real rate
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of accumulation of transactable wealth. In the 1970-77 period, except for large
households in the married and other categories, no household type much improved
the real value of its mean transactable wealth. Table 9-26 shows that, in 1977, the
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mean age of the heads of accumulating large households in the married and other
categories was in the 40s.The mean ages of the heads of the four low-28
accumulation types of households all prove significantly older or younger than this.
Particularly remarkable is the downward trend in the age of heads of single
families with two or more members. This reflects growth in the number of couples
living together without benefit of marriage. For these households, unsettled
property rights and uncertainty about the coupl&s commitment to a shared future
may erect substantial disincentives to homeownership and saving.
Data on portfolio shares (not reported here) show that the turnaround
between 1962-70 and 1970-77 in savings performance by large nonsingle families
was an across-the-board one. During the 1970s, relative to their initial wealth,
these families expanded their holdings of retail assets, wholesale assets and real-
estate equity all at above-average rates. As they cut their savings rate, single
families markedly shifted the composition of their wealth accumulations. One-
person single households, which had concentrated on amassing real-estate equity in
the 1960s, accumulated their wealth in financial assets in the 1970s. Larger single
households (people living with friends and relatives) had reallocated wealth from
real-estate equity into financial assets during the 1960s, but reversed the pattern
in the 1970s, apparently in response to improved implicit returns on owner-
occupied housing.
Table 9-27 darifies the role of home equity in the saving behavior of
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households of different type by tracking trends in homeownership and mortgage
financing by household type. The most marked trends are the continued high use of
leverage by large married households, its increasing use by single and other
nonmarried households, and the increased rate of homeownership for one-person
households. For so-called small savers --householdsnot wealthy enough to invest
directly in wholesale financial assets, these trends may be interpreted as a form of29
disintermediation. Small savers with large and stable households foundit profit-
able to shift some of their deposit balances intohousing. These investments
offered untaxed implicit returns, protectionagainst unanticipated inflation, a
better anticipated real after-tax explicit return thansmall-denomination accounts,
and a regularized and partially subsidizedarrangement for borrowing against small
accumulations of wealth. Even for wealthy households,some of these advantages
apply. In particular, changes in the level and structure of federalcapital-gains tax
rates enacted during the 1970s enhanced the taxadvantages of owner-occupied
housing relative to stock-market investments.
SUMMARY AND CAUTION
Our analysis of SRC data supports three broad inferences.First, life-cycle
patterns of accumulation and asset holdings shift importantly with suchchanges in
the economic environment as inflation risk, taxstructure, and transactions costs.
Perhaps because of such shifts, Consistent evidence ofaverage postretirement
decumulation emerged only for cohorts of advancedage. Second, between the
1960s and 1970s, a sharp turnaround occurred in theprofiles of household saving
and homeownership. Households whose headswere 55andolder were strong savers
in the 1960s, but younger households proved to be theprincipal accumulators of the
1970s. A parallel shift in savings propensities occurred betweenlarge married or
previously married households and other families, suggesting thatmovements in the
expected value and variance of the implicit return onowner-occupied housing may
have evoked the adjustment. During the!960s, all age groups increased their
homeownership rates. In the 1970s, large nonsingle households and households
whose heads were under 45accentuatedthe trend, while most other households
merely continued it. Third, the compositions of 1962 and 1977portfolios end up far30
closer to each other than to 1970 values. This suggests that some of the portfolio
churning observed in SRC data reflects disintermediation that was reversed during
the 1970s as deposit institutions made ceilings on explicit interest less effective by
broadening their product line to develop less-restricted liability instruments and to
expand the ways in which they could pay implicit interest on regulated accounts.
Combined with a capital-gains tax structure that taxed nominal as well as real
price appreciation, these ceilings made the implicit and explicit tax rate on
financial savings rise with the rate of inflation. This lowered the saving rate for
many households and distorted the allocation of transactable wealth between
financial and real-estate assets for everyone.
Because the hypotheses of differential behavior and portfolio churning are
such straightforward ones, this paper emphasizes statistical description over
statistical testing and interpretation. By conventional Chi-square tests, saving and
asset-holding behaviors reported by respondents differ significantly across demo-
graphic categories. But we must keep in mind two problems in drawing inferences
from SRC data. First, observations taken at only three points in time cannot
discriminate closely among plausible alternative explanations for observed differ-
ences in dass-level behavior. Second, in a survey context the ultimate meaningful-
ness of statistical tests depends on the validity of joint hypotheses about the
appropriateness of the sampling frame and the accuracy of respondent reports.
Validation studies (Ferber et a!. 1969a and 1969b) indicate that noncooperation,
especially among high-income groups, leads to a systematic understatement of
sample variances. Ascertaining the ways in which the three survey observations of
cross-section data on respondent wealth management are each, in fact, representa-
tive of the population of U.S. households is a herculean task. This task can be
accomplished only by carefully examining sampling frames and respondent behavior31
in alternative data sets and tirelesslyendeavoring to reconcile whatever differ-
ences emerge.
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1.Peek (1983) explores the link between capital gains and saving as measured by
the national income and product accounts. Friend and Silberman (1975) use
1963 Federal Reserve Survey data to estimate the effect of capital gains on
what they call saving net of depreciation on owned homes.
2.In equilibrium, some of the benefit would be shifted backwards to specialized
construction labor and rnatel-ials (Diamond 1983).
3.Using Canadian data, Dicks-Mireau and King (1982) investigate the effect of
pension wealth on the composition of household portfolios.
4.On the grounds that a mortgage is obviously a financial instrument, we might
have chosen to categorize mortgage debt as a negative financial asset. Our
approach has the advantage of incorporating the portfolio restriction that
mortgage loans are limited to owners of real estate. Programming diff i-
culties persuaded us to defer our efforts to estimate the market value of
mortgage debt.36
5.Detailedanalysis of 1977 survey data indicate that a decrease in the
homeownership rate for older households was recorded only for nonmarried
households, especially households whose heads were separated, divorced, or
widowed.37
Table 9-1
Comparison of Survey and Time-Series Estimates of Cumulative
Growth Rates Between Survey Dates in the Mean Value of Components
of Net Transactable Wealth
(inpercent)
1962-1970 1970-1977
1961-1969 Survey 1969-1976 Survey
Cumulative EstimatesCumulativeEstimates
Growthfor of Cumulative Growth forof Cumulative
F.R. data Growth F.R. data Growth
Deposits andSavingsBonds 80.9 85.9 109.7 100.0
MarketableBonds 105.2 829.3 73.2 78.7
Corporate Equities 49.0 97.2 3.5 54.8
Owner-Occupied Real Estate 73.2 65.8 118.2 108.0
InvestmentReal Estate 48.9 132.2 67.1 26.9
1-lome Mortgages 84.7 59.6 95.5 61.2
Other Mortgages 92.2 57.4 43.3 50.3
NetTransactable Wealth 63.8 88.4 68.5 79.8
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Division of Research and
Statistics,Flow of Funds Section, Balance Sheets for the U.S.Economy 1945-8 1,
Washington, D.C.: 1982; and calculations made from data tapes of the 1977
ConsumerCredit Survey and of the 1962 and 1970Surveys of Consumer Finances.
Inthe Flow of Funds accounts, the household sector is consolidated with personal
trusts and nonprofit organizations.
Notes:Survey data record savingsbonds, marketable bonds, and mortgages at par
value.From the Flow of Funds Accounts, the sum of miscellaneous assets
and mortgage assets is treated as a loose proxy for the SRC concept of











Source: Census estimates from Carliner (1982).
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Table 9-2
Comparison of Homeownership Rates for Married Households and One-person
Households in the Edited 1977 SRC Sample With Census
Estimates for the Same Year
One-Person_Households ____________________________
Homeownership Homeownership
Rate in Rate in
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Cumulative Percentage Change in the Real and Nominal Value of
Accumulated Mean Savings Between Survey Dates,




Age of Change in Mean Change in Mean
Household Net Wealth Net Wealth
Head Between Between
(in years) 1962 and 1970 1970 and 1977
Nominal WealthReal Wealth Nominal WealthReal Wealth
Under25 -28.5 -43.1 413.8 237.0
25to34 41.4 12.5 189.2 89.6
35to 44 77.4 41.1 113.0 39.7
45 to 54 37.4 9.1 168.0 75.7
55to 64 131.0 83.8 59.7 4.8
65 andolder 121.5 76.2 7.6 -29.5
All Respondents 88.4 49.9 79.8 17.9
Note: Percentage changes in real wealth employ base-date wealth that has been
inflated by cumulative growth in the implicit deflator f or personal consumption
expenditures (PCE) figured from either the first quarter of 1962 to the second
quarter of 1970 or from the latter quarter to the third quarter of 1977, as
appropriate. Let c represent cumulative growth in the deflator for PCE between
survey dates and W0 andrepresent mean base-date and end-date wealth,















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Distribution of Cumulative Changes in the Nominal Value of Mean
Transactable Wealth Between Survey Dates,
by Age of Household Head
(in percent)
Percentage of 1962-1970 Percentage of 1970-77
increase Attributable to: increase Attributable to:
Age of
Household RetailWholesale Real- Retail WholesaleReal—
Head FinancialFinancialEstate FinancialFinancialEstate
(in years) Assets AssetsEquity Assets AssetsEquity
Under 25 448a 1809a 360a 27.4 25.3 47.3
25-34 22.1 -1.7 79.6 17.4 18.9 63.7
35-44 16.1 7.6 76.4 17.0 12.7 70.4
45-54 18.8 -15.4 96.7 16.0 29.0 55.2
55-64 16.5 34.9 48.9 23.3 17.8 59.6
65andolder 16.5 36.7 46.8 136.3 -206.6 172.1
All Respondents 17.6 22.8 59.6 22.4 14.8 63.1
aBecausenominal wealth declined for this age dass during the 1962-1970 period,
thesigns of thepercentage allocations arethe reverse of observed portfolio
movements. In fact, holdings of wholesale assets declined while the other two
portfolio components increased.Age of
Table 9-8
Distribution of Selected Assets and Respondent Population
























































99.9 100.1 100.0 100.1 2117
1970Survey
Under25 1.7 0.3 0.5 0.7 1.5 10.0 257
..25-34 6.4 2.3 6.6 5.7 12.5 .18.3 471
35-44 14.0 12.6 20.0 17.4 24.3 18.9 488
45-54 17.3 10.123.3 19.5 24.9 20.0 514
55-64 26.1 37.5 24.8 27.6 19.6 16.5 426
65andolder 34.6 37.2 24.8 29.0 17.2 16.3 420
All











2.6 2.1 1.3 1.7 1.5 8.8 225
10.6 9.8 12.3 11.5 17.8 23.0 587
13.7 13.1 19.4 17.2 22.1 15.8 402
19.9 31.0 24.9 25.0 23.4 17.1 437
24.0 33.4 22.8 24.9 18.8 16.8 429
29.1 10.6 19.3 19.7 16.3 18.5 472




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Tobit Estimates of Wealth-Based Engels Curves for Holdings of Retail Financial
Assets, for Samples Disaggregated by the Age of Household Head
Wealth-Squared
Estimated Coefficient
Age of Household Slope Coefficients for:Times Twice
Head Estimated Wealth Mean
(in years) Intercept Wealth Squared Wealth R2d.f.
1962 Data Set
321.0 .06 -.18 D-06 .001
Under25 (5.51) (3.55) (1.57) .24 189
440.0 -.00 .33 D-05 .033
25-34 (4.49) (.14) (27.75) .86 410
624.0 .07 .38 D-07 .001
35-44 (4.46) (8.82) (3.80) .74 492
-5.0 .19 -.74 D-06 -.024
45-54 (.02) (12.41) (8.67) .30410
33.0 .21 -.56 D-06 -.0 18
55-64 (.08) (9.25) (4.54) .32 278
-932.5 .40 -.10 D-05 -.037
65 and older (1.61) (15.32) (9.98) .46 320
408.1 .15 -.70 D-07 -.002
Pooled Sample (3.22) (25.88) (6.84) .352114• 43
(Table9-10 Continued)
1970 Data Set
165.0 48b -.18 D_O4b -.055
Under 25 (2.30) (10.75) (6.45) .41 254
186.0 20b -.65 D_O6b -.009
25-34 (1.44) (15.52) (10.23) .37 468
_256•0a 21b 39 D.O6b -.016
35-44 (.74) (14.82) (12.15) .32 486
-154.0 .20 -.53 D-06 -.024
45-54 (.40) (10.22) (4.12) .31 511
1195.0 .18 -.11 D_06a -.008
55-64 (1.79) (13.40) (11.80) .30 423
2312•0b 20b -.16 D_O6b -.013
65 and older (3.06) (14.83) (12.04) .35 417
9710a .16 -.11 006a -.005
PooledSample (5.19) (33.62) (25.98)' .31 257350
(Table 9-10 Continued)
1977 Data Set
349.0 .27 -.13 D-06 -.002
Under 25 (.69) (5.68) (.42) .46 222
7030a 25b -.20 D_O6b,c-.008
25-34 (1.55) (15.71) (8.44) .40 584
_1589•0a 22b -.13 D_O6b,d-.012
35-44 (1.54) (10.33) (3.99) .35 399
-707.0 .23 -.22 D_06a -.026
45-54 (.69) (13.05) (9.93) .32 432
-.25 D_O6d -.030
55-64 (1.75) (13.81) (8.57) .38 426
_48800a,d 47d -.48 D_O6a,d-.042
65 and older (3.97) (20.67) (11.75) .51 469
_1865•0b,d 30b,d-.28 D_O6b,d-.023
Pooled Sample (4.5) (36.18) (23.02) .392560
Notes: Coefficient t-values are reported in parentheses. A superscript a indicates that
the t-value of the difference from the corresponding coefficient in 1962 lies
between 1.96 and 3.0; b that this value exceeds 3.0. A superscript c indicates
that t-value of difference from corresponding coefficient in 1970 is between
1.96 and 3.0; ci that this value exceeds 3.0.51
Table 9-11
Tobit Estimatesof Wealth-Based Engels CurvesforHoldings of WholesaleFinancial
Assets, for Samples Disaggregated by the Age of Household Head
Wealth-Squared
Estimated Coefficient
Age of Household Slope Coefficients for:Times Twice
Head Estimated Wealth Mean
(in years) Intercept Wealth Squared Wealth R2
1962 Data Set
d.f.
Under25 (.54) (4.97) (28.64) .99 189
19.0 .05 .22 0-05 .022
25-34 (.20) (3.93) (18.95) .80410
-3035.0 .43 .18 D-06 .004
35-44 (7.76) (18.88) (6.53) .92 492
-549.0 .11 .21 0-05 .068
45-54 (.94) (3.28) (10.90) .68 410
531.0 -.07 .38 D-05 .125
55-64
• (1.20) (2.98) (28.29) .90 278
1073.0 -.08 .19 0-05 .070
65 andolder (1.86) (3.00) (18.27) .74320
-2134.0 .33 .34 0-06 .008
PooledSample (10.13) (33.31) (19.83) .75211452
(Table9-11 Continued)
1970 Data Set
-32.0 .17 -.83 D_OSb 025
Under25 (.82) (6.95) (5.36) .17 254
-21.0 .07 .23D_O6b .003
25-34 (.21) (7.24) (4.59) .52 468
-2672.0 30b -.18 D_O6b -.008
35-44 (3.46) (9.62) (2.47) .40 485
-1042.0 .10 .81D_O6b .036
45-54 (1.69) (3.22) (3.96) .32 511
53460b 31b .28 D_O6b .021
55-64 (5.42) (16.15) (20.30) .96 423
-2888.0 25a .28 D_O6b .023
65 and older (1.16) (5.44) (6.42) .62 417
-1577.0 •19b .34 D-06 .015
Pooled Sample (3.47) (16.82) (33.96) .78 257353
(Table 9-11 Continued)
1977 Data Set
747.0 -. 33 D_OSa .052
Under 25 (1.64) (3.70) (12.32) .71 222
415.0 04d .10 D_OSa,d .041
25-34 (1.15) (2.81) (57.51) .96 584
3126•0b,d 12b,d.11 DO5 .098
35-44 (3.02) (5.54) (32.64) .89 399
-3141.0 .07 D-06 .094
45-54 (2.06) (2.79) (23.70) .91 432
-2017.0 08d .77 DO6bd .094
55-64 (1.25) (3.08) (23.15) .88 426
38900b •20b -.88 D_O7b,d-.008
65 and older (4.16) (11.34) (2.82) .34 469
-1034.0 04b,d .78 D_O6b,d .064
Pooled Sample (1.99) (4.25) (51.33) .84 2560
Notes: Coefficient t-values are reported in parentheses. A superscript a indicates that
the t-value of the difference from the corresponding coefficient in 1962 lies
between 1.96 and 3.0; b that this value exceeds 3.0. A superscript C indicates
that t-value of difference from corresponding coefficient in 1970 is between











Tobit Estimates of Wealth-Based Engels Curves for the Equity in Owner-Occupied









74.0 .12-.79 0-06 -.003
(1.05) (5.91) (5.71) .16
155.0 .57-.38 0-05 -.038
25-34 (.85) (23.36)(17.02) .58
2045.0 .40-.41 0-06 -.010
35-44 (6.82) (22.80)(19.14) .54
1073.0 .51-.11 0-05 -.036
45-54 (2.08) (16.74) (6.26) .60
1544.0 .49-.19 0-05 -.063
55-64 (3.15) (18.13)(13.05) .56
1980.0 .36-.64 0-06 -.023














-184.0 .45 .39 D-05 .012
Under 25 (1.77) (6.96) (.96) .57 29
439.0 .54 -.17 D-05 -.024
25-34 (2.01) (24.76) (15.80) .61 218
2887.0 .43 -.71 D-06 -.030
35-44 (5.36) (20.02) (14.29) .50 341
4155.0 .34 .30 D-06 .013
45-54 (5.69) (9.42) (1.23) .52 378
9186.0 .13 .11 D-07 .001
55-64 (9.75) (6.86) (.83) .50 327
6125.0 .20 -.79 D-07 -.006
65 and older (7.11) (12.75) (5.26) .46 299
4967.0 .22 -.64 D-07 -.003
PooledSample (18.27) (31.47) (10.57) .44 1592(Table 9-12 Continued) 56
1977 Data Set
14.0 .47 -.23 D-05 -.036
Under 25 (.03) (9.62) (7.57) .32 45
2301.0 .49 -.60 D-06 -.025
25-34 (4.26) (26.00) (20.93) .54 319
1984.0 .62 -.61 D-06 -.054
35—44 (1.43) (22.18) (13.71) .61 293
9932.0 .38 -.26 D-06 -.031
45-54 (6.34) (14.32) (7.61) .49 325
8216.0 .39 -.39 D-06 -.047
55-64 (5.21) (16.26) (11.95) .41 303
11087.0 .15 .77 D-06 .067
65 and older (8.83) (6.29) (18.27) .77 303
5478.0 .42 -.30 D-06 -.025
Pooled Sample (9.26) (34.95) (17.56) .43 1593
Note: Coefficient t-values are reported in parentheses.57 Table 9-13
Tobit Estimates of Wealth-Based Engels Curves for the Equity in Investment
Real-Estate, for Samples Disaggregated by the Age of Household Head
Wealth-Squared
Estimated Coefficient
Age of Household Slope Coefficients for:Times No. of
Head Estimated Wealth Mean Nonlimit
(in years) InterceptWealthSquared Wealth R2 Observations
1962 Data Set
-445.0 .70 -.43 D-05 -.018
Under 25 (3.44) (19.34)(16.83) .69 9
-614.0 .38 -.17 D-05 -.017
25-34 (3.31) (15.48) (7.60) .45 .54
366.0 .10 .19 D-06 .004
35—44 (1.48) (7.21) (10.73) .85 81
-519.0 .19-.29D-06 -.009
45-54 (1.25) (7.92) (2.15) .29 89
-2108.0 .38-.13 D-05 -.043
55-64 (3.94) (12.88) (8.03) .42 57
-2120.0 .32-.22 D-06 -.008
65 and older (2.54) (8.35) (1.44) .37 62
-247.0 .18 .94 D-07 .002
Pooled Sample (1.47) (23.02) (6.91) .50 35258
(Table9-13 Continued)
1970 Data Set
52.0 -.10 .22 D-04 .067
Under25 (.63) (2.01) (7.01) .37 11
-604.0 .18 .21 D-05 .030
25-34 (2.49) (7.45) (17.73) .83 57
41.0 .07 .13 D-05 .054
35-44 (.40) (1.61) (13.56) .73 86
-2959.0 .36 -.58 D-06 -.049
45-54 (4.20) (10.11) (2.48) .38 125
-5035.0 .38 -.18 D-06 -.014
55-64 (4.89) (18.74) (12.56) .55 100
-5549.0 .35 .42 D-07 .003
65 and older (2.38) (8.33) (1.02) .40 76
-4360.0 .43 -.17 D-06 -.008
PooledSample (8.94) (34.59) (15.84) .43 455(Table 9-13 Continued) 59
1977 Data Set
-1081.0 .41 -.92D-Q6 -.014
Under 25 (1.61) (6.41) (2.28) .37 11
-2014.0 .30 -.30 D-06 -.012
25-34 (3.71) (16.04) (10.48) .36 78
-3521.0 .28 -.34 D-06 -.030
35-44 (2.98) (11.68) (8.98) .26 97
-6085.0 .32 -.31 D-06 -.037
45-54 (4.15) (13.10) (9.55) .33 98
-3758.0 .24 -.14 D-06 -.017
55—64 (2.61) (10.94) (4.54) .37 106
-2317.0 .18 -.20 D-06 -.017
65 and older (2.69) (11.21) (6.80) .23 61
-2578.0 .24 -.20 D-06 -.016
Pooled Sample (5.99) (27.86) (15.89) .30 452
Note: Coefficient t-values are reported in parentheses.60
Table9-14
Patternof Significant Coefficient Shifts Across Survey Dates
in Engels Curvesfor Equity in Real Estate, by Age of Household Head
in 1962,1970, and 1977
*
Ageof Household Shift in Shift in
Head Intercept Slope for Slope for
(in years) Shift Wealth Wealth-Squared
1. 1970 versus 1962 Data Sets
Under 25 Significantat 1% Significant at 1%
25-34 Significant at 1% Significant at 1%
Significant at 1%
45-54 ,.. ... Significantat 1%
55-64 Significantat 5% Significantat 1% Significant at 1%
65 and over
All Respondents ... Significantat 1%
2. 1977versus 1962 Data Sets
Under 25
25-34 Significant at 5% Significantat 1%
35-44 Significant at 1% Significant at 1% Significant at 1%
45-54 Significant at 5% ... Significantat 5%
.55-64 Significantat 5% Significant at 5% Significant at 1%
65 and older Significant at 1% Significant at 1% Significant at 1%
All Respondents Significant at 1% Significant at 1%61
(Table9-14 Continued)
3. 1977 versus1970Data Sets
Under25
25-34 ... ... Significantat 1%
35-44 Significantat 1% Significant at 1% Significant at 1%
45-54
55-64 Significantat 1% Significant at 1%
65andolder Significant at 5% Significantat 1% Significant at 1%
All Respondents Significant at 1% ... Significantat 1%
Note: Coefficient shifts that are not significant by conventional dummy-variable
t-tests are represented by an ellipsis (...).Table 9-15
Changes in the Real and Nominal Value of Accumulated Mean Savings
BetweenSurveyDates, by Age Cohorts Determined by the






















Nominal Wealth Real Wealth
1962AgeCohorts in1970
184.1 126.1 9.6 26-33 3928
33-42 12643 252.1 180.1 13.3
43-52 11478 97.2 56.9 9.6
53-62 19745 121.4 76.2 18.7
63-72 24207 147.1 96.6 33.8
73andolder 20092 109.7 66.8 43.8
All Cohorts 13484 111.6 68.3 14.0
1962AgeCohorts in1977
1673.8 825.6 16.7 33-40 35713
40-49 43841 874.1 408.2 15.4
50-59 49863 422.3 172.5 15.5
60-69 42679 262.5 '89.1 13.4
70-79 24989 151.8 31.4 6.8
80 and older 14276 78.0 -7.2 -2.8






































1970 Age Cohortsin 1977
6364
Table 9-16
Dollar Increments Between Survey Dates in the Mean Value
of Real-Estate Assets and Three Components of Net Transactable Wealth, by
Age Cohorts Determined by the Age of a Household Head in 1962 and 1970
(all entries in dollars)
Age of
Household Retail Wholesale Real- Real-
Head Financial Financial Estate Estate
(in years) Assets Assets Equity Assets
1962 Age Cohorts in 1970
26-33 846 -842 3928 9516
33—42 1891 2107 8647 13315
43—52 1744 235 9505 12458
53—62 3170 5789 10823 11175
63—72 5546 7298 11362 11326
73 and older 4298 7890 7902 7952
All Cohorts 2324 3029 8141 10727
1962 Age Cohorts in 1977
33-40 5522 4705 25486 40554
40-49 6815 6455 30628 38718
50-59 9940 11189 28937 31953
60-69 9668 8485 24622 23885
70-79 11259 826 12902 11715
80 and older 4079 3665 6531 6392
All Cohorts 7882 6828 23931 2886365
(Table 9-16 Continued)
1970 Age Cohorts in 1977
25-31 2212 1989 11031 21325
32-41 4564 5941 21894 30464
42-51 5932 6526 18788 19671
52-61 7954 11958 21387 22410
62-71 6796 -1965 11560 10428
72and older 3140 —6436 -991 -1929



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Percentage Distribution of Selected Assets and of Respondent Population
Across Age Cohorts of the 1962 and 1970 Ae Classes, at the































































































per each one percent of
68
(Table 9-18 Continued)
1970Age Cohorts in 1977
25-31 6.2(.34) 5.0(.27) 7.8(.42)
32-41 13.3(.69) 16.1(.83) 18.8(.97)
42-5 1 17.4(1.03)20.7(1.22)20.5(1.21)
52-61 26.2(1.30) 36.6(1.82) 27.4(1.36)
62-71 22.9(1.53) 16.3(1.09) 17.8(1.19)
72andolder 14.0(1.36) 5.4(.52) 7.6(.74)
Totals100.0 100.1 99.9
Note: The figures recorded in parentheses report the
balances in each portfolio categorycontrolled





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Age of Heads of Households of Different Sizes
in 1962, 1970, and 1977
(in years)
1962 Survey 1970 Survey 1977 Survey
NumberofPersonsMean StandardMean Standard MeanStandard
inHousehold Age DeviationAge Deviation AgeDeviation
One 48.9 20.7 51.7 20.7 53.6 21.1
Two 54.4 16.2 53.8 17.5 51.8 18.1
Threeormore 40.0 11.0 40.8 11.7 40.9 12.0






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Cumulative PercentageChangeintheReal and Nominal Value of
Accumulated Savings Between Survey Dates, for Households




Change in Mean Change in Mean
Number of Net Wealth Net Wealth
Persons Between Between
in Household 1962 and 1970 1970 and 1977
Nominal WealthReal WealthNominal WealthReal Wealth
One 111.2 68.0 53.5 0.7
Two 82.3 45.0 48.0 -3.0
Threeor more 70.9 36.0 125.1 47.6
All Respondents 88.4 49.9 79.8 17.9
Note: As in Table 9-4,percentage changes in real wealth are calculated from base-date
wealth figures that have been inflated by the cumulative growth rate in the
implicit deflator for personal consumption expenditures figured from survey























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Gumulative Percentage Change in the Real and Nominal Value of
Accumulated Mean Savings Between Survey Dates,




Change in Mean Change in Mean
Net Wealth Net Wealth
Type of Between Between
Household 1962 and 1970 1970 and 1977
Nominal Wealth Real Wealth Nominal Wealth Real Wealth
Single,OneinHousehold 109.2 66.4 54.9 1.6
Single, Two or More 58.1 25.8 5.0 -31.1
Married,TwoOnly 93.3 53.7 53.2 0.5
Married, Threeor More 72.8 37.4 129.8 50.7
Other, One Only 95.8 55.8 51.8 -0.4
Other, Twoor More 35.6 7.9 119.0 43.6
AllHouseholds Classified 88.5 50.0 80.3 18.2
Note:As in Table 9-5, percentage changes in real wealth are calculated from
base-date wealth figures that have been inflated by the observed cumulative
growth rate in the implicit deflator for personal consumption expenditures,
calculated from survey quarter to survey quarter of the years in question.78
Table 9-26
Age of Heads of Different Types of Households
in 1962, 1970, and 1977
(inyears)
1962 Survey 1970 Survey 1977Survey
Type of Mean StandardMean StandardMean Standard
Household ge DeviationAge DeviationAge Deviation
Single,One in Household 35.5 17.6 33.8 17.6 36.2 18.2
Single,Two or More 43.8 19.0 40.4 16.8 35.4 17.6
Married,Two Only 54.6 15.9 54.8 17.5 53.6 17.5
Married, Three or More 40.0 10.9 40.7 11.4 41.0 11.7
Other, One Only 62.3 13.9 62.7 13.6 62.2 16.7
Other, Two or More 46.5 15.0 46.4 15.3 45.4 15.3
All Households Classified45.5 16.1 46.5 16.5 46.8 17.2
Note: A few observations (7 in 1962 and 3 in 1970) coded as "married, one only" are
thrown into the "married, two only" class.T
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